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Abstract- The paper addresses formal systems verification of 
autonomous underwater vehicles (AUV). The verification process 
includes hybrid system modelling and formulation of the discrete 
representation using natural language programming (sEnglish) 
via compositional abstraction - employing data, perception and 
action abstraction methods; the translation of the discrete 
abstraction into interpreted script programming language (ISPL) 
of a mainstream multi-agent model checker (MCMAS) for 
reachability verification of undesirable states, and ultimately the 
bridging into the discrete event system representation in Stateflow 
formalism. Using this technique, modelling and model checking 
can include the complete physical system of the autonomous 
vehicle, its multi-agent software on board and also the human 
interface represented as an agent. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
AUV mission aborts are very costly. If a vehicle performs 
seafloor survey at a depth of 3000m and aborts its mission, 
then at 2m/s speed at 30 degrees rise it takes an hour to surface 
and several hours if surfacing by positive buoyancy. Adding to 
this the hours spent on diagnosis and repair the mission delay 
can be half a day at a cost of about £1000 per hour [1]. Part of 
the reason for this is that an AUV is an engineering platform 
that contains many different subsystems that were not designed 
to work together. The system engineer needs to design an 
inherently reliable vehicle from individual parts that are 
reliable in themselves. A mission is deemed successful when 
the vehicle surfaces at the end of its mission without any 
irrecoverable faults during the mission and, even more 
importantly, all data are stored onboard. Very few publications 
are available on reliability of AUVs, the two major studies 
available are [2] and [3]. Also a report of the Autosub Loss 
Inquiry Board [4] supports these findings. Reference [2] 
summarizes 14 years of experience with Autosub I and II [5], 
during which 240 missions were completed. The authors in [3] 
classify the cause of failures as: 
(A) Hardware component failures (electronics hardware, 
mechanical problems, pressure vessel leaks, bad GPS, acoustic 
telemetry, power supply problems); 
(B) Hardware component failure in combination with 
unusual external interference (acoustic interference, bad GPS); 
(C) Vehicle operational errors (collision with vessel, 
software errors, failure to dive); 
(D) Human operational errors during preparation, launch and 
recovery; 
(A)-(D) classes mean different dimensions of the system that 
must be controlled to avoid failures. One can also classify 
failures by saying: (a) which subsystem failed (power, 
communication, control electronics, mechanical system, 
payload); (b) which functionality has been affected 
(maneuverability, descend, ascend, ability to perform mission 
steps, ability to provide functional environment for payload, 
etc.); (c) how severely the failure is (no action needed, human 
action needed, not critical, moderately critical, critical, 
unrecoverable vehicle). 
In [6] a software (RECOVERY) is reported that offers 
practical self-diagnostics for AUVs. Enhanced environmental 
awareness [7], [8] of autonomous robots with suitable agent 
based programming can enhance the level of intelligent 
problem solving behavior in face of problems. These 
approaches are only effective after one actually has a 
technically reliable vehicle already. The research reported here 
investigates a methodology for reliable one-off design that 
includes evaluation of traditional engineering fields in 
combination with reactive agents used on AUVs that execute a 
sequence of mission commands. Reference [9] presents a 
systematic method of verification for an AUV as a hybrid 
system. A bottom-up approach is developed in which the 
bottom level of the hybrid system hierarchy is verified first, 
and each higher-level is subsequently verified with the 
assumption that all lower levels are correct. At each step in the 
verification process, lower and higher levels than the one 
currently being verified are abstracted, thus reducing the 
complexity of verification. They algorithmically developed and 
integrated into the design a hierarchical mission-level 
controller for an autonomous underwater vehicle. Reference 
[10] is concerned with the development of an unmanned 
vehicle (UV) ontology and automated conversion of vehicle 
specific information into a data format constrained by this 
ontology. This is useful by enabling the development of 
planning and analysis tools for arbitrary vehicles and enabling 
facilitating interoperability between dissimilar vehicles. 
Implementation of this ontology is carried out using the 
Extensible Markup Language (XML). 
Reference [11] describes the validation and verification of 
the remote agent for spacecraft autonomy. 
There is no overall reliability technology available that 
would be able to cope with all aspects of AUV reliability: 
(1) The RECOVERY [6] systems offers a partial solution by 
enhancing survivability by on board diagnosis. The problem 
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however remains that some failures still may happen and even 
the cleverest artificial intelligence (AI) system will not be able 
to rescue the situation. 
(2) No system offers a satisfactory solution for the failsafe 
design and operation of AUVs by humans when operation 
includes the work of technical personnel who can make 
mistakes. 
(3) Although subsystem robustness tests are performed there 
is no proper modelling and assessment of an assembled AUV 
with regards to the actual risks where operations of subsystems 
are interdependent. 
(4) There is no systematic modelling approach available to 
understand the environment in which the AUV will operate. 
This paper reports research to enhance the reliability of 
autonomous underwater vehicles, with a particular focus on the 
Autosub AUV (see Fig. 1). The paper is organized as follows. 
Section II presents the outline structure of the integrity and 
fault assessment system (IFAS) as a hybrid systems modelling 
problem. Section III describes the process of creating a discrete 
event model via discrete abstractions obtained by formulation 
with natural language sentences. Section IV and V shows how 
the discrete event system can be translated in a Stateflow chart 
for the purpose of simulation, respectively for verification in a 
multi-agent model checker system. Section VI illustrates some 
of the modelling and code involved before conclusions are 
drawn. 
II. INTEGRITY AND FAULT ASSESSMENT SYSTEM 
A waterfall model of the IFAS development process (see 
Fig. 2) is enumerated in the following:  
1) A formal model is defined for the examined autonomous 
system. 
2) The model is refined for adapting it to a mainstream 
model checker. The extensive refinement consists of a discrete 
abstraction of the hybrid system model and a conversion of the 
design into a formalism accepted by the model checking tool. 
3) The requirements of the system are analyzed, hence 
asserting the properties that the design must satisfy. The 
specifications to be verified are formulated in the model 
checker’s logical formalism. 
4) The model checker is used to verify whether these 
requirements are satisfied or whether bugs exist. The 
consequences of partial or complete faults in physical 
components are also tested. 
5) If the verification stage of the model checking produces 
counter examples (to demonstrate possible faults) consisting of 
an execution trace [12], then the design process is resumed to 
extend and/or to refine the modelled system. 
Research efforts in the area of autonomous systems [13],[14] 
have shown that most successful approaches need to abstract 
out parts of the system. Avoiding the use of hybrid automatons 
in the modelling process (as a basis of modelling the overall 
system) is crucial as that helps to avoid the “curse of 
dimensionality” and therefore poor overall effectiveness of 
verification. We carry out modularization, where systems are 
composed of subsystems connected by finite state inputs and 
outputs, can be assessed for reliability on the basis of the 
reliability of their component subsystems. This way the total 
reliability of a complex system can be evolved from bottom up. 
Various definitions of hybrid systems have been published in 
[15-19]. In the following a generic denotation is used. 
A hybrid system or automaton is a tuple 
 ܪ ൌ ሺܸ, ܺ, ݂, ݐ݅݊ܫ, ݒ݊ܫ, ܧ, ݀ݎܩ, ܴሻ (1) 
where, 
ܸ represents a finite set of locations or discrete states; 
ܺ ك Թ୬ is a set of continuous states; 
݂: ܸ ൈ ܺ ՜ 2Թ౤  is a vector field of flow determining the 
continuous dynamics; 
ك ݐ݅݊ܫ  ܸ ൈ ܺ is the set of initial states; 
ݒ݊ܫ: ܸ ՜ 2Թ౤ assigns to each discrete state an invariant set; 
ܧ ك ܸ ൈ ܸ is a set of edges; 
݀ݎܩ: ܧ ՜ 2Թ౤  is a guard condition; 
ܴ: ܧ ൈ ܺ ՜ 2Թ౤  is a reset map. 
Each discrete state  has a set of initial states ሼݔ א
ܺ|ሺݍ, ݔሻ א ݐ݅݊ܫሽ , a vector field ݂ሺݍ, ݔሻ ك Թ௡ and an invariant 
set ݒ݊ܫሺݍሻ ك Թ௡ associated with it. Starting from the initial 
value corresponding to the discrete states, the continuous state 
evolves in time satisfying the condition ݔሶ א ݂ሺݍ, ݔሻ. The 
continuous state can evolve as long as it remains in the 
invariant set, i.e. in the domain of permitted evolution within a 
discrete state. When the continuous state ݔ reaches the guard 
conditions ݀ݎܩ௤,௤ᇲ ك Թ௡ of the edge ሺݍ, ݍᇱሻ א ܧ, the switching 
of the discrete states occurs from ݍ to ݍᇱ; at the same time the 
continuous state is reset to a value in ܴ௤,௤ᇲሺݔሻ ك Թ௡. 
Fig. 2. IFAS development stages.Fig. 1. Autosub 6000 of the National Oceanography Centre at the 
University of Southampton that can reach an ocean depth of 6km.
Finite discrete systems can be obtained from hybrid systems 
by abstraction. The abstraction process can help to produce a 
less complex but less detailed model of the hybrid system [20], 
while maintaining the properties of interest. If the properties of 
interest are preserved by bisimulation in the obtained finite 
discrete system, then the verification of this abstracted system 
should be equivalent to checking the same property on the 
original system [16]. 
A transformation or parsing process applied to an abstracted 
system may be necessary so that the system complies with the 
formalism of the model checking tool. The desired property or 
requirement to be verified is also to be formulated in terms of 
state sets in the language of the model checking tool. 
Re-discretization demands can arise if a system does not 
meet the decidability requirement. In this case partitioning of 
the state space needs to be continued by further abstraction of 
the model. The decidability requirement is met, if for a given 
model of the system, there exists a computational or 
algorithmic approach, that can determine whether the system 
satisfies the desired property [16] in a finite number of steps 
with an a priori known bound. 
III. CREATING A DISCRETE EVENT MODEL VIA DISCRETE 
ABSTRACTIONS 
The Autosub AUV [21] has adopted a modular, distributed 
and networked control architecture for system implementation. 
Subsystem nodes are distributed throughout the vehicle and 
carry out tasks such as guidance/mission control, control of 
position, depth and forward speed, navigation, actuator control, 
battery/power system monitoring and communication.  
Discretization of the Autosub system is achieved by means 
of compositional abstraction. A finite state transition system 
illustrates the functionality of each network control node. The 
overall abstraction of the Autosub hybrid system model results 
from the parallel composition of the individual finite state 
transition systems. Modelling also includes material and 
structural (static) properties of engineering subsystems 
selected, hence the approach is broader than formal checking 
of the control systems or the multi-agent software on board. 
 
A. Labeled transition systems (LTS) 
The finite abstraction of a hybrid system generates a labeled 
transition system. The labeled transition system [22],[23] is a 
tuple 
  ܶீ ൌ ሺܳ, ߑ,՜,ܳை, ࣦ, ܮ, ܳிሻ  (2) 
 
where, 
ܳ is the finite set of states; 
ߑ is the alphabet of event; 
՜ك ܳ ൈ ߑ ൈ ܳ is the set of transition relations; 
ܳை ك ܳ is a set of initial states; 
ࣦ is a countable set of labels; 
ܮ: ܳ ՜ ࣦ is the labeling function; 
ܳி ك ܳ is a set of final states; 
A transition ሺݍଵ, ߪ, ݍଶሻ ك ܳ ൈ ߑ ൈ ܳ  is denoted as ݍଵ
ఙ՜ ݍଶ, 
where ݍଵ is the predecessor of state ݍଶ and ݍଶ is a successor of 
ݍଵ at the occurrence of event ߪ. 
Taking into account a formulation in terms of a multi-agent 
system, the transition system ܶீ ൌ ሺܳ, ߑ,՜,ܳை, ࣦ, ܮ, ܳிሻ is 
decomposed into parallel constituents, such that ܶீ ൌ ஺ܶ௚௧భ ڮצ צ ஺ܶ௚௧೙, ݊ א Գ. The components of the transition system ܶீ  
are the transition systems with tuple: 
஺ܶ௚௧೔ ൌ ቀܳ஺௚௧೔ , ߑ஺௚௧೔, ՜஺௚௧೔ , ܳைಲ೒೟೔ , ࣦ஺௚௧೔ , ܮ஺௚௧೔, ܳிಲ೒೟೔ቁ , ݅ ൌ1,… , ݊.  (3) 
A state ݍ of the ܶீ  transition system is denoted by ݍ ൌ
ሺݍଵ, … , ݍ௡ሻ א ܳ, where ܳ ൌ ܳ஺௚௧భ ൈ …ൈ ܳ஺௚௧೙ . 
State ݍ of the overall transition system ܶீ  is a global state of 
the multi-agent system with all ሼݐ݃ܣଵ, … , ݐ݃ܣ௡ሽ agents active 
at any time. 
 
B. Natural language programming using System English 
(sEnglish) 
Natural language programming (NLP) in sEnglish [20] is 
used for abstraction of continuous states to discrete states, that 
allows an intellectual problem formulation by the use of 
natural sentences, not constraining to the required technicalities 
of a modelling input language. NLP in sEnglish is theoretically 
well founded method to record relationships of models and 
procedures on board the AUV and in its environment. A major 
advantage of using the NLP paradigm is that it opens up the 
potentials of the human brain’s natural abstraction ability of 
our environment. Any engineer can benefit from doing 
programming using this development paradigm where 
conceptual structures are defined, then top level sentences are 
explained by other sentences and in return those by other 
sentences, until there is no more abstracted detail needed and 
plain computer code is the meaning of the lower level 
sentences. An NLP document also looks like a technical paper 
or report and can easily be understood and shared in team 
work. In our approach NLP is used to formulate functionality 
of the AUV at various abstraction levels and to link the 
abstractions to Stateflow™ charts and to MCMAS that is a 
model checker for multi-agent systems [24, 25]. Further details 
of NLP are illustrated in Section VI. 
The ontology described in (4-8) has been chosen to provide 
the conceptual representation of the labeled transition system 
that is resulted by the natural language formulation performed 
discrete abstraction process. 
4) ܵܣܯ) illustrates the concept of the multi-agent system 
formed by its consituents, i.e. of the set of agents; 
 
 ܵܣܯ ൌ ݐ݃ܣڂ௜ , ݅ א Գ (4) 
 
The concept of an agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ is defined by a tuple (5) 
consisting of its name, its set of operational modes, its set of 
event attributes and the set of possible transition relations. 
 
ݐ݃ܣ௜ ൌ  ൫ܽ݃݁݊݁݀݋݉_݈ܽ݊݋݅ݐܽݎ݁݌݋ڂ,݁݉ܽ݊_ݐ௜௝ , ڂ ݁݁ݐݑܾ݅ݎݐݐܽ_ݐ݊݁ݒ௜௞ ,
ڂ ݊݋݅ݐ݈ܽ݁ݎ_݊݋݅ݐ݅ݏ݊ܽݎݐ௜௟ሻ, ݅, ݆, ݇, ݈ א Գ  (5) 
The operational mode concept (6) refers to the local states 
ܳ஺௚௧೔  that an agent can find itself in during its operation. The 
set of operational modes of an agent can be defined by the 
name of its finite local states ܳ஺௚௧೔ ; or in terms of local 
variables, whose set of ordered pairs can ultimately define the 
agent’s operational modes. 
 
݁݀݋݉_݈ܽ݊݋݅ݐܽݎ݁݌݋௜௝ ൌሺ݈݁ݐܽݐݏ_݈ܽܿ݋_݊ܽ݉݁,
݊݋݅ݐ݂݅݊݅݁݀_݈ܾ݁ܽ݅ݎܽݒ, ݈ܾ݁ܽ݅ݎܽݒ_݊ܽ݉݁, ݁݌ݕݐ_݈ܾ݁ܽ݅ݎܽݒ, ݊݋݅ݐܽݑ݈ܽݒ_݈ܾ݁ܽ݅ݎܽݒ,
݉ݑ݉݅݊݅݉_݁݃݊ܽݎ_݁ݑ݈ܽݒ, ݉ݑ݉݅ݔܽ݉_݁݃݊ܽݎ_݁ݑ݈ܽݒሻ ݅, ݆ א Գ 
  (6) 
 
The event attribute concept (7) grasps the relationship 
between the LTS set of labels ℓ௜௞ ك ࣦ஺௚௧೔  (actions) that when 
assigned to a local state ݍ௜௝ א ܳ஺௚௧೔  by the labeling function, 
results a consequent alphabet of events ߪ௜௞ ك ߑ஺௚௧೔ . Hence, the 
function ݄: ܳ஺௚௧೔ ൈ ࣦA୥୲౟ ՜ ߑ஺௚௧೔  defines the mapping from the 
Cartesian product of the finite set of local states ܳ஺௚௧೔  and the 
agent’s countable set of labels ࣦ஺௚௧೔ , to the alphabet of events 
ߑ஺௚௧೔  . 
The labeling function ܮ஺௚௧೔: ܳ஺௚௧೔ ՜ ࣦ஺௚௧೔  assigns the 
actions to each operational mode, while the function ݄: ܳ஺௚௧೔ ൈ
ࣦ஺௚௧೔ ՜ ߑ஺௚௧೔  assigns the triggered events to the actions 
performed in a given operational mode, so that ߪ௜௞ ൌ
݂൫ݍ௜௝, ℓ௜௞൯. 
 
݁݁ݐݑܾ݅ݎݐݐܽ_ݐ݊݁ݒ௜௞ ൌ ሺ݁ݐ݊݁ݒ_݊ܽ݉݁, ܽܿ݊݋݅ݐ_݈ܾ݈ܽ݁, ݄݁ݐܽݐݏ_݈ܽܿ݋݈_ݐݏ݋ሻ ,
݅, ݇ א Գ  (7) 
 
Each transition relation (8) shows the possible evolution of 
the agent from one local state to another. 
The operational mode evolution concept consists of the set 
of all transitions of an agent ՜஺௚௧೔ك ܳ஺௚௧೔ ൈ ߑ஺௚௧೔ ൈ ܳ஺௚௧೔ , 
that is the set of ordered pairs ൫ݍ௜௝, ߪ௜௞, ݍ௜௝ᇲ൯ ك ܳ஺௚௧೔ ൈ ߑ஺௚௧೔ ൈ
ܳ஺௚௧೔, ݅, ݆, ݆ᇱ, ݇ א Գ where ݍ௜௝  is the predecesor state of ݍ௜௝ᇲ , 
and ݍ௜௝ᇲ  is the successor  state of ݍ௜௝ , at the occurrence of event 
ߪ௜௞. The components of transition relation’s tuple are therefore, 
the ݍ௜௝  source local state from where the agent evolves into the 
ݍ௜௝ᇲ  destination local state, at the occurrence of event ߪ௜௞, the 
latter being triggered when the agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ performs the action 
 ℓ௜௞ א ࣦ஺௚௧೔  assigned to its source local state, such that 
ℓ௜௞ ൌ  ܮ஺௚௧೔൫ݍ௜௝൯. 
 
݊݋݅ݐ݈ܽ݁ݎ_݊݋݅ݐ݅ݏ݊ܽݎݐ௜௞ ൌሺ݁ݐܽݐݏ_݈ܽܿ݋݈_݁ܿݎݑ݋ݏ, ݀݁݁ݐܽݐݏ_݈ܽܿ݋݈_݊݋݅ݐܽ݊݅ݐݏ, ݁ݐ݊݁ݒ_݊ܽ݉݁,
ܽܿ݊݋݅ݐ_݈ܾ݈ܽ݁, ܽܿݐ݊݁݃ܽ_݃݊݅݉ݎ݋݂ݎ݁݌_݊݋݅ݐሻ, ݅, ݇ א Գ (8) 
 
 
C. Stateflow formalism 
The SimulinkTM and StateflowTM software tools developed 
by Mathworks became an industry standard and are a popular 
choice for modelling hybrid systems and embedded 
applications. Stateflow charts allow the creation of discrete 
state transition systems based on hierarchical state machines. 
Simulink blocks provide the ability to model the continuous 
dynamics corresponding to the discrete states. 
The discrete model obtained by compositional abstraction 
and modelled by the use of natural language sentences, 
translates into the Stateflow™ formalism for the purpose of 
simulation of the discrete event system and automatic code 
generation. The natural language model uses a MOL (machine 
ontology language) ontology and states operational mode 
attributes and transitions in terms of human concepts in 
sentences while permitting unambiguous translation into a 
formal agent definition. 
Adopting the notation from [26], a Stateflow chart is 
described by the tuple  
  ܵܨ ൌ ሺܦ, ܧ, ܵ, ݐܿܨ, ܶ, ݂ሻ (9) 
where, 
ܦ ൌ ܦூ ׫ ܦை ׫ ܦ௅  is a finite set of typed variables 
representing data objects in the Stateflow chart; ܦ is 
partitioned into input variables ܦூ , output variables ܦை and 
local variables ܦ௅; 
ܧ ൌ ܧூ ׫ ܧை ׫ ܧ௅  is a finite set of events that is partitioned 
into input variables ܧூ , output variables ܧை and local variables 
ܧ௅; 
ܵ is a finite set of states, where each state is a tuple:  
ܵ ൌ ሺ݁݊݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݕݎݐ, ݁݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݐ݅ݔ, ݀݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݃݊݅ݎݑ, ݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݐ݊݁ݒ݁ ݊݋ሻ       (10) 
An action can contain a function call, can be an assignment 
of an expression to a variable or can be an event broadcast. 
ݐܿܨ is a finite set of MatlabTM or graphical functions that can 
be included as a call statement in the expression of a state’s 
݁݊݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݃݊݅ݎݑ݀ ,݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݐ݅ݔ݁ ,݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݕݎݐ or ݊݋݅ݐܿܽ ݐ݊݁ݒ݁ ݊݋; 
ܶ is a finite set of transitions, where each transition is a tuple 
ܶ ൌ ሺܿݎݏ, ݀ݐݏ, ݁, ܿ, ܿܽ, ܽݐሻ. ܿݎݏ א ܵ represents the source state, 
݀ݐݏ א ܵ is the destination state, ݁ א ܧ is an event, ܿ is the 
condition expression, ܿܽ is the condition action and ܽݐ is the 
transition action; 
݂: ܵ ՜ ሺሼܽ݊݀, ݎ݋ሽ ൈ 2ௌሻ is a mapping from the finite set of 
states to the Cartesian product of the states’ decomposition 
type and the power set of ܵ. Parallel ሺandሻ state decomposition 
represents states at the appropriate level in the hierarchy that 
are always active at the same time. Exclusive ሺorሻ 
decomposition describes states that are mutually exclusive. 
ܥ א 2ௌ ൈ ܦ  represents the configuration of a Stateflow chart 
and is a tuple consisting of the set of active states and a 
valuation for all the variables from the finite set ܦ .ܦ denotes 
the set of all valuations of a variable set ܦ. 
 
D. MCMAS 
MCMAS is a model checker for multi-agent systems, 
intended for the automatic verification of formulae with 
temporal and epistemic properties in deontic interpreted 
systems (DIS). 
MCMAS uses an extended variant of an interpreted system’s 
formalism [27]. Each agent from a system of agents can be 
modelled by means of a set of local states, a set of actions, a 
protocol and an evolution function [24, 25]. An agent  ሺ݅ א
ሼ1, … , ݊ሽ, ݊ א Գ) is characterized by a finite set of local states 
ܮ௜, and by a finite set of actions ݐܿܣ௜. The protocol ௜ܲ  is a rule 
that establishes which action can be performed by an agent in a 
given local state. The protocol function ௜ܲ ׷ ܮ௜՜ 2஺௖௧೔  assigns a 
set of actions to a local state. The evolution function  ݐ௜: ܮ௜ ൈ
ܮா ൈ ݐܿܣଵ ൈ …ݐܿܣ௡ ൈ ݐܿܣா ՜ ܮ௜ determines how the local 
state of an agent evolves based on the agent’s local state, on 
the local state of a special agent ܧ modelling the environment, 
and on the actions of all agents. 
As addressed in [24] and [25], an element ݃ א ܵ of the 
Cartesian product of the agents’ local states ܵ ൌ ܮଵ ൈ …ൈ
ܮ௡ ൈ ܮா  is called a global state. An element ߙ א ݐܿܣ of the 
Cartesian product of the agents’ action  ݐܿܣ ൌ ݐܿܣଵ ൈ …ൈ
ݐܿܣ௡ ൈ ݐܿܣா is a tuple of actions and is referred to as a joint 
action. The evolution of the global states of the system is 
described by the function ݐ: ܵ ൈ ݐܿܣ ՜ ܵ. An element ݃ א ܵ 
represents a global state. Hence, given a global state ݃, the 
local state of agent ݅ in the global state ݃ is denoted by the 
symbol ݈௜ሺ݃ሻ. 
Given a set ܫ ك ܵ of possible initial global states, the 
protocols and the evolution functions generate a set ܩ ك ܵ of 
reachable global states, obtained by all the possible runs of the 
system. Given a set of atomic propositions ܲ, the evaluation 
relation ܸ ك ܵ ൈ ܲ completes the description of the interpreted 
system. 
Interpreted systems were extended to include the notion of 
correct behaviour [28]. According to this extension, the set of 
local states ܮ௜ is partitioned into the non-empty set ܩ௜ of 
allowed or correct states, and a set ܴ௜ of disallowed states, such 
that ܮ௜ ൌ ܩ௜ ׫ ܴ௜ and ܩ௜ ת ܴ௜ ൌ ׎. 
Hence, given a set of agents ሼ1, … , ݊ሽ, a deontic interpreted 
system (DIS) is defined as the tuple: 
ܵܫܦ ൌ ۃሺܩ௜, ܴ௜, ݐܿܣ௜, ௜ܲ , ݐ௜ሻ௜אሼ௜,…,௡ሽ, ሺܩா, ܴா, ݐܿܣா, ாܲ, ݐாሻ, ܫ, ܸۄ 
  (11) 
The following language applies to a deontic interpreted 
system: 
߮ ׸ൌ ݌|൓߮| 
|߮ ש ߮|ܧ|߮ܩܧ|߮ܺܧሾܷ߮߰ሿ|ܭ௜߮|ܧ௰߮|ܥ௰߮|ܦ௰߮| ௜ܱ߮|ܭ෡௜௰߮ 
  (12) 
 
With the language above, the interpreted systems provides 
semantics to reason about temporal and epistemic properties 
[24, 25]. In this grammar ݌ א ܲ is an atomic proposition, ܺܧ 
ܩܧ and ܷܧ are standard computation tree logic (CTL) 
operators [12]. The remaining CTL operators can be derived 
from the above. The formula ܭ௜߮ ሺ݅ א ሼ1, … , ݊ሽሻ expresses 
“agent ݅ knows ߮”. The symbol ߁ denotes a group of agents. 
The formula ܧ௰߮ expresses “everybody in group ߁ knows ߮ ”; 
the formula ܥ௰߮ expresses “ ߮ is common knowledge in 
group ߁ ”; the formula ܦ௰߮  expresses “ ߮ is distributed 
knowledge in group ߁ ”; the formula ௜ܱ߮ expresses that “under 
all the correct alternatives for agent ݅, ߮ holds”; lastly, the 
formula ܭ෡௜௰߮ expresses the knowledge that agent ݅ has on the 
assumption that all agents in group ߁ are functioning correctly. 
MCMAS inherently handles the interpretation of formulae 
by associating a Kripke model to the deontic interpreted 
systems. For further details on the Kripke model representation 
and the inductive definition of the satisfaction conditions, the 
user is asked to refer to [24] and [25]. 
IV. TRANSLATION TOOL FROM NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROGRAMMING ONTOLOGY TO DISCRETE EVENT 
SYSTEM STATEFLOW FORMALISM 
An NLP-based natural language agent model uses a MOL 
(machine ontology language) ontology and states operational 
mode attributes and transitions in terms of human concepts in 
sentences while permitting unambiguous translation into a 
formal agent definition. We have developed a tool to translate 
the natural language programming abstractions of agent 
operations to the discrete event system representation in 
Stafelow formalism. This translation process has been intended 
for the purpose to execute the simulations of the discrete event 
system in the Stateflow environment, and in addition to 
provide means of automatic code generation and deployment to 
embedded targets as stand-alone applications. A formal 
definition of the multi-agent system resulting from this 
translation process can be described as follows. 
Given a multi-agent system ܵܣܯ of ݊ agents in natural 
language statements, the mapping of translation is denoted by 
݂ሺܵܣܯሻ ൌ ሺܽ݊݀, ሼݐ݃ܣଵ, … , ݐ݃ܣ௡ሽሻ, where ܵܣܯ is the 
Stateflow chart with parallel state decomposition. Due to this 
representation the states ሼݐ݃ܣଵ,… , ݐ݃ܣ௡ሽ from this level of the 
hierarchy are active at the same time, hence the agents can 
evolve simultaneously. 
An agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ (݅ א ሼ1, … , ݊ሽ, ݊ א Գ) is described by the 
mapping function ݂ሺݐ݃ܣ௜ሻ ൌ ሺݎ݋, ሼݏ௜ଵ, … , ݏ௜௠ሽሻ, where 
ݏ௜௝ א ௜ܵ , ݆ א ሼ1, … ,݉ሽ,݉ א Գ) are local states of the 
respective agent. In this implementation the agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ is a 
superstate with exclusive state decomposition, whose substates 
are the agent’s local states. Superstate ݐ݃ܣ௜ being of exclusive 
decomposition, only one of its local state ݏ௜௝  can be active at a 
time. 
The finite set of actions for agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ is realized and 
defined as a group of functions ݐܿܨ௜ that reside in and are 
declared local to the ݐ݃ܣ௜ superstate (Fig. 3). 
The actions that can be performed by an agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ in a 
given local state ݏ௜௝  is denoted by ݂ܿݐ௜௞ ك ݐܿܨ௜ , ݇ א
ሼ1, … , ݌ሽ, ݌ א Գ). When an action is performed within the local 
state, a transition with a triggered event label can be activated. 
If the source state of the transition is active, the transition is 
taken, thus enabling the agent to evolve from one local state to 
another. Hence, an event label can activate a transition using an 
underlying event broadcast mechanism that occures in a local 
state’s action. 
The local state of agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ in an initial global state is 
marked by assigning a ݏ௜௝  local state as default. 
A MOL ontology has been defined for the conceptual 
representation of the Stateflow objects in a NLP along with 
sentence definitions, to endow the creation of Stateflow charts 
with the use of sEnglish natural language sentences. This 
enables direct linking of human concepts of operation to the 
formal definition of agents. 
The ontology used for the conceptual representation of the 
labeled transition system provide the type of objects, their 
properties and relations, that are processed and transposed into 
the Stateflow ontology representation to create the discrete 
event system representation as Stateflow charts. 
V. TRANSLATION TOOL FROM NATURAL LANGUAGE 
PROGRAMMING ONTOLOGY TO MULTI-AGENT MODEL 
CHECKING 
The natural language programming abstraction of the multi-
agent systems is also linked to the interpreted script of the 
multi-agent model checker MCMAS for verification. 
An ontology defined for the ISPL representation 
encapsulates the representational requirements of the multi-
agent model checker’s input language. 
The agent constituents of the multi-agent system are 
modelled by means of a set of local states definable by state 
names or in terms of local variables, a set of actions, a protocol 
and an evolution function. 
In terms of the labeled transition system representation, the 
DIS (deontic interpreted system) action ݐܿܣ௜ definition of an 
agent ݅ (݅ א ሼ1, … , ݊ሽ, ݊ א Գ) relate to the countable set of 
labels ࣦ஺௚௧೔  of an agent ݐ݃ܣ௜ from the LTS representation. 
The DIS protocol function represents the LTS labeling 
function assigning a subset of labels to a finite set of states, i.e. 
the actions that the agent can perform in a given local state. 
The protocol function for a given local state ݍ௜௝ א ܳ஺௚௧೔  is 
expressed as the subset  ℓ௜௞ ك ࣦ஺௚௧೔ , where ℓ௜௞ ൌ  ܮ஺௚௧೔൫ݍ௜௝൯,  
are the set of labels assigned to the local state  ݍ௜௝ א ܳ஺௚௧೔  
(݅ א ሼ1, … , ݊ሽ, ݆ א ሼ1, … ,݉ሽ, ݇ א ሼ1, … , ݋ሽ, ݊,݉, ݋ א Գ).  
The DIS evolution function implements the mapping to a 
given local state, regarded as the succesor state, from all its 
possible predecessor states. The evolution function of a given 
local state ݍ௜௝ᇲ א ܳ஺௚௧೔  is expressed as the set of all ordered 
pairs of actions and local states ൫ℓ௜௞, ݍ௜௝൯ ك ࣦ஺௚௧೔ ൈ ܳ஺௚௧೔ , 
such that all transitions ൫ݍ௜௝, ߪ௜௞, ݍ௜௝ᇲ൯ occurred at the event 
ߪ௜௞ ൌ ݄൫ݍ௜௝, ℓ௜௞൯ have the same successor state ݍ௜௝ᇲ , ሺ݅ א
ሼ1, … , ݊ሽ, ݆ א ሼ1, … ,݉ሽ, ݇ א ሼ1, … , ݋ሽ,݉, ݊, ݋ א Գሻ.  
Prior to verification, the description of the multi-agent 
system is completed with the definition of the evaluation 
function to establish the atomic propositions, the initial states, 
agent groups, fairness statements (as defined in ISPL) and 
formulae to be verified. 
 
VI. MODELLING EXAMPLE 
To illustrate the aforementioned problem formulation using 
natural language programming and its translation to the model 
checkers’ input language and to Stateflow, an example of the 
Collision and Obstacle Avoidance process/agent (see Fig. 3) is 
presented [21],[29]. 
Sensor measurements from acoustic doppler current profilers 
(ADCP) and from a forward looking echosounder provide 
environmental awareness capability for the collision and 
obstacle avoidance process. In the following illustration, the 
‘limited headroom acknowledged’ and ‘obstacle ahead 
acknowledged’ are events that are triggered by the ‘limited 
headroom event received from adcp’, respectively the ‘obstacle 
ahead event received from echosounder’ actions performed by 
the ‘obstacle avoidance’ agent. The ‘limited headroom event 
received from adcp’ action illustrate that both the vehicle’s 
altitude above the seafloor and range to the ice overhead 
crosses a permitted threshold value. The ‘obstacle ahead event 
received from echosounder’ activity indicates that there is an 
obstruction on the vehicle’s path. 
‘Waiting’ is the active state during normal operation of the 
AUV, when the collision and obstacle avoidance is not taking 
any action [29]. When triggered by the ‘limited headroom 
acknowledged’ or ‘obstacle ahead acknowledged’ event, the 
state of the avoidance process switches to ‘retreating’. The 
actions that can be taken in this state consist of a 180 degree 
turn and a retreat along the same path it had come along, to a 
preset safe retreat distance. When the retreat distance is 
covered, the ‘try new track’ state is entered, during which the 
vehicle will try a new track, parallel to the original. If the 
vehicle encounters an obstacle, it will switch back to 
‘retreating’ state. If the vehicle has covered a clearance 
distance on the alternative path, the obstacle avoidance process 
is finished, the ‘trying new track’ state is exited and the 
‘waiting’ state is entered. 
 
The natural language programming paradigm uses sentences, 
sections, subsections, ontology description sections, topic 
classification, problem area description, etc. An ontology of 
concepts is developed, defining for each concept an associated 
object class with the most relevant attributes that are needed in 
the problem area addressed by the natural language program.  
The following ontology is used to illustrate the concepts of 




    @constituents: set of agents 
 
>agent 
    @name: char 
    @operational profile: set of operational modes 
    @action triggered events: set of event attributes 
    @operational mode evolution: set of transition relations 
 
>operational mode 
    @local state name: cell 
    @variable definition: cell 
    @variable name: cell 
    @variable type: cell 
    @variable valuation: cell 
    @value range minimum: cell 
    @value range maximum: cell 
>event attribute 
    @event name: cell 
    @action label: cell 
    @host local state: cell 
 
>transition relation 
    @source local state: cell 
    @destination local state: cell 
    @event name: cell 
    @action label: cell 
    @action performing agent: cell 
 
>ispl representation 
    @ispl agents: set of interpreted systems agents 
    @ispl evaluation function: char 
    @ispl initial states: char 
    @ispl groups: char 
    @ispl fairness formulae: char 
    @ispl verification formulae: char 
 
>interpreted systems agent 
    @agent name: char 
    @observable variables: char 
    @variables: char 
    @red states: char 
    @actions: char 
    @protocol function: char 
    @evolution function: char 
 
The ‘multi-agent system’, ‘agent’, ‘operational mode’, 
‘event attributes’ and ‘transition relation’ object classes relate 
to the discrete model of a generic agent definition formulated 
in NLP (formulated in “system English” or for short in 
“sEnglish”), while the ‘ispl representation’ and ‘interpreted 
systems agent’ object classes are utilized for the representation 
of the agent in the model checker’s input language. 
 
Natural language programming advocates the top-down 
method for problem formulation. The top level sentence 
creates the shell of the generic agent and is defined by a 
sequence of other sentences that use concepts from the 
ontology. Every sentence that has been used is defined in terms 
of other sentences, or by a simple sentence that executes code 
written in an associated high level programming language. 
In the following passage an example formulation of the 




Define agent obstacle avoidance. 
Define the agent name as ‘obstacle avoidance’. Define all 
operational modes of obstacle avoidance. Define all actions of 
obstacle avoidance. Define all events generated by the obstacle 
avoidance. 
 
Define all operational modes of obstacle avoidance. 
The ‘waiting’ is an operational mode of ‘obstacle avoidance’. The 
preconditions of ‘waiting’ of ‘obstacle avoidance’ can be ‘clearance 
distance covered by vehicle, maintain waiting’. The exit conditions of 
‘waiting’ of ‘obstacle avoidance’ can be ‘limited headroom 
acknowledged while waiting, obstacle ahead acknowledged while 
waiting, maintain waiting’. 
The ‘retreating’ is an operational mode of ‘obstacle avoidance’. 
The preconditions of ‘retreating’ of ‘obstacle avoidance’ can be 
‘limited headroom acknowledged while trying new track, obstacle 
ahead acknowledged while trying new track, limited headroom 
acknowledged while waiting, obstacle ahead acknowledged while 
waiting, maintain retreating’. The exit conditions of ‘retreating’ of 
‘obstacle avoidance’ can be ‘retreat distance covered by vehicle, 
limited headroom acknowledged while retreating, obstacle ahead 
acknowledged while retreating, maintain retreating’. 
The ‘trying new track’ is an operational mode of ‘obstacle 
avoidance’. The preconditions of ‘trying new track’ of ‘obstacle 
avoidance’ can be ‘retreat distance covered by vehicle, limited 
headroom acknowledged while retreating, obstacle ahead 
acknowledged while retreating, maintain trying new track’. The exit 
conditions of ‘trying new track’ of ‘obstacle avoidance’ can be 
‘clearance distance covered by vehicle, limited headroom 
acknowledged while trying new track, obstacle ahead  acknowledged 
while trying new track, maintain trying new track’. 
 
Define all actions of obstacle avoidance. 
The ‘turn and retreat, preset safe retreat distance from obstacle was 
reached, obstacle ahead event received from echosounder, limited 
headroom event received from adcp’ actions can be performed by 
‘obstacle avoidance’ in ‘retreating’ host operational mode. 
The ‘try new track, vehicle completed twice the retreat distance and 
attempts to reacquire original track, obstacle ahead event received 
from echosounder, limited headroom event received from adcp’ 
actions can be performed by ‘obstacle avoidance’ in ‘trying new 
track’ host operational mode. 
The ‘avoidance process is idling, obstacle ahead event received 
from echosounder, limited headroom event received from adcp’ 
actions can be perfomed by ‘obstacle avoidance’ in ‘waiting’ host 
operational mode. 
 
Define all events generated by the obstacle avoidance. 
The ‘clearance distance covered by vehicle’ is an event of ‘obstacle 
avoidance’ triggered by the action ‘vehicle completed twice the retreat 
distance and attempts to reacquire original track’. 
The ‘maintain trying new track’ is an event of ‘obstacle avoidance’ 
triggered by the action ‘try new track’. The ‘maintain retreating’ is an 
event of ‘obstacle avoidance’ triggered by the action ‘turn and 
retreat’. The ‘maintain waiting’ is an event of ‘obstacle avoidance’ 
triggered by the action ‘avoidance process is idling’. 
The ‘retreat distance covered by vehicle’ is an event of ‘obstacle 
avoidance’ triggered by the action ‘preset safe retreat distance from 
obstacle was reached’. 
The ‘obstacle ahead acknowledged while waiting, obstacle ahead 
acknowledged while retreating, obstacle ahead acknowledged while 
trying new track’ is an event of ‘obstacle avoidance’ triggered by the 
action ‘obstacle ahead event received from echosounder’. 
The ‘limited headroom acknowledged while waiting, limited 
headroom acknowledged while retreating, limited headroom 
acknowledged while trying new track’ is an event of ‘obstacle 
avoidance’ triggered by the action ‘limited headroom event received 




  state : {waiting, retreating, trying_new_track}; 
 end Vars 
 
 RedStates: 
 end RedStates 
 
 Actions = { avoidance_process_is_idling, limited_headroom_event_received_from_adcp, obstacle_ahead_event_received_from_echosounder, 




  state = retreating : {limited_headroom_event_received_from_adcp, obstacle_ahead_event_received_from_echosounder, 
preset_safe_retreat_distance_from_obstacle_was_reached, turn_and_retreat}; 
  state = trying_new_track : {limited_headroom_event_received_from_adcp, obstacle_ahead_event_received_from_echosounder, 
try_new_track, vehicle_completed_twice_the_retreat_distance_and_attempts_to_reacquire_original_track}; 
  state = waiting : {avoidance_process_is_idling, limited_headroom_event_received_from_adcp, 
obstacle_ahead_event_received_from_echosounder}; 
 end Protocol 
 
 Evolution: 
  state = retreating if (((obstacle_avoidance.Action = limited_headroom_event_received_from_adcp) or (obstacle_avoidance.Action = 
obstacle_ahead_event_received_from_echosounder)) and ((state = trying_new_track) or (state = waiting))) or ((obstacle_avoidance.Action = turn_and_retreat) 
and (state = retreating)); 
  state = trying_new_track if (((obstacle_avoidance.Action = limited_headroom_event_received_from_adcp) or (obstacle_avoidance.Action 
= obstacle_ahead_event_received_from_echosounder) or (obstacle_avoidance.Action = preset_safe_retreat_distance_from_obstacle_was_reached)) and (state = 
retreating)) or ((obstacle_avoidance.Action = try_new_track) and (state = trying_new_track)); 
  state = waiting if ((obstacle_avoidance.Action = vehicle_completed_twice_the_retreat_distance_and_attempts_to_reacquire_original_track) 
and (state = trying_new_track)) or ((obstacle_avoidance.Action = avoidance_process_is_idling) and (state = waiting));  






 Fig. 3. Obstacle avoidance Stateflow chart representation 
Table 1. Obstacle avoidance agent definition in ISPL formalism
Table 1 illustrates the agent definition framework in ISPL 
formalism, resulted by the translation process from the natural 
language formulation and ontology representation. The agent 
‘Obstacle_avoidance’ is modelled by means of a set of local 
states, i.e. ‘waiting’, ‘retreating’, ‘try_new_track’; the set of 
actions that the agent can perform; the protocol function 
illustrating the actions that the agent can perform in a specific 
local state; and lastly by the evolution function, that shows 
how the local state of the agent evolves based on its own and 
the remaining agent’s local states and the actions that are 
performed there.  
Fig. 3 details the discrete event system representation of the 
agent using the Stateflow formalism. 
 
Elaborate specifications can be formulated with sEnglish in 
order to provide the verification requirements that the multi-
agent system representation of the Autosub AUV must satisfy. 
 
Add the definitions of the verification formulae to the multi-agent 
system description. 
The sentence ‘it is always true that, if, Obstacle avoided 
acknowledgement is received, then, the, Mission controller, knows 
that, the, Position controller, knows that, Obstacle is avoided’ 
represents a requirement that needs to be verified. 
The sentence ‘it is always true that, it will not hold that, it is 
possible to get to a state where, Launch procedure starts, and, Vehicle 
ready, does not hold’ represents a requirement that needs to be 
verified. 
 
At the execution of the above sEnglish program the 
following logic formulae are resulted (13,14): 
 
ܩܣ ቀܱܾ݀݁ݒ݅݁ܿ݁ݎ_ݏ݅_ݐ݈݊݁݉݁݃݀݁ݓ݋݊݇ܿܽ_݀݁݀݅݋ݒܽ_݈݁ܿܽݐݏ 
՜  ܭ൫ݎ݈݈݁݋ݎݐ݊݋ܿ_݊݋݅ݏݏ݅ܯ, ܭሺܲݎ݈݈݁݋ݎݐ݊݋ܿ_݊݋݅ݐ݅ݏ݋, ܱܾ݀݁݀݅݋ݒܽ_ݏ݅_݈݁ܿܽݐݏሻ൯ቁ 
  (13) 
 
ܩܣ൫! ܨܧሺݐݎܽݐݏ_݁ݎݑ݀݁ܿ݋ݎ݌_݄ܿ݊ݑܽܮ ܽ݊݀ ! ܸ݄݈݁݅ܿ݁_ݕ݀ܽ݁ݎሻ൯ 




ݐݎܽݐݏ_݁ݎݑ݀݁ܿ݋ݎ݌_݄ܿ݊ݑܽܮ are atomic propositions; 
ݎ݈݈݁݋ݎݐ݊݋ܿ_݊݋݅ݐ݅ݏ݋ܲ ,ݎ݈݈݁݋ݎݐ݊݋ܿ_݊݋݅ݏݏ݅ܯ are ISPL agents; 
ܣ is the “for all computation paths” CTL path quantifier; 
ܩ is the “always” or “globally” temporal operator specifying 
that a property hold at every state on the path; 
ܭ is an epistemic operator, expressing the knowledge of an 
agent; 
ܧ is the “for some computation paths” CTL path quantifier; 
ܨ is the “eventually” or “at some point in the future” 
temporal operator specifying that a property will hold at some 
state on the path; 
՜ is the implication logical connective; 
ܽ݊݀ is the conjunction logical connective; 
! is the negation logical connective. 
 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
This paper has introduced a complete methodology for the 
integrity and fault assessment system of complex autonomous 
engineering systems such as an autonomous underwater 
vehicle, by formal verification. Modelling can also include 
material and structural (static) properties of engineering 
subsystems selected, hence the approach is broader than formal 
checking of the control systems. The first system models are 
obtained by hybrid system modelling. Then natural language 
models are abstracted from the hybrid models in NLP. This 
NLP-based model can be automatically compiled into 
Stateflow and ISPL for simulation or formal verification by 
model checking that can test whether safety critical temporal 
logic statements hold. A crucial step of our procedure is the 
bisimulation based abstraction in terms of NLP statements that 
not only help verification but can be a vital part of the agents 
being able to report problems to human operators in English. 
Component failures, that may affect or endanger mission 
success, are represented as discrete events in the MCMAS 
system. Reliability can be tested under various assumptions of 
component reliability and within the given limits of accuracy 
of the discrete abstractions used for the environment and 
internal feedback loops. 
The multi-agent IFAS verification system created by us also 
allows the inclusion of all the network communications and 
behavior of human controllers. 
Further work will be concerned with extending the IFAS 
system to an iterative design process of autonomous vehicles. 
Also the human operator’s role as an agent will be a focus of 
our interest. Eliminating human errors by warning and safety 
systems is vitally important to mission success and to avoid 
loss of vehicles. 
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